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on consultations with a view to settlement of the banana disputes -·. 
Report to the Council 
on consultations with a view to settlement of the banana disputes 
On the basis of the Commission Communication of 26 May 1999, the services have 
· held numerous contacts with the complainants and other governments concerned, but 
also with many of the operators in the banana business. 
l.  Position of Parties to the dispute 
Consultations with the «principal suppliers», the ACP and the US administration have 
continued on the options contained in the Communication and other possibilities. 
The interlocutors were all in favour of a clearly defined WTO-compatible system. 
The ACP underlined the EU's obligations under the Lome Convention and its. 
hanana ProtocoL They would prefer the preservation of the present regime and do not. 
accept that the WTO Panel has made the application of Lome Protocol n° 5 extremely 
difficult (none of the complainant countries seem to be ready to grant the necessary 
GATT article XIII waiver). 
The Latin American countries and operators all want to protect their export 
earnings on  the  high  value  EU. banana market through  the  maintenance of a TRQ 
system but disagree among themselves on the way it should be operated. Although in 
principal not questioning the pJ;eferential  treatment for the ACP they underline their 
special situation as developing countries at1d the difficulties which they allege the EU 
has created for them on  the banana markets.  Most recognise that sending too many 
bananas to  Europe would reduce the attractiveness and profitability of the European 
markets to the·m.  .  .  . 
The US administration continues to insist on .a pre-1993 reference period for 
the distribution of licences, an  option which the EU cannot accept for technical and 
legal reasons and which as a matter of fact the WTO-Panel has not requested the EU 
to go  for.  However, the options for the distribution of licences which  the Panel  has 
mentioned  as  WTO-compatible  e.g.  the  «First-come,  first  served  principle»  or 
«auctioning» are either not acceptable for the US or only acceptable in a very narrow 
. interpretation which gives major advantages to the main US operators and constitutes 
an almost unbearable administrativ'e burden for the EU custom authorities.  · 
The US  would in  any event like to see the Community move eventually to a 
flat  tariff and  accept  that  we  could  also  choose  to  do  so  immediately.  However, 
although they are not a supplier of bananas, they have made it clear that they are keen 
to debate with us the level of such a tariff. Although they have not yet taken a final 
position, they have to.ld  us that, in their view, the figure of 275 €/t. referred to in the Commission's previous communication is well above the level of protection provided 
by  the  present TRQ regime.  However such  an  argument  can  only  be  made  in  the 
context of a TRQ, since the obligation to apply no  prohibitive tariff only applies in 
that context. If there were no TRQ, but just a tari IT,  the level of this tariff can be set at 
any  level  the  EC  chooses,  subject to the need to  offer compensation  under  Article 
XXVIII. 
An  insufficient  level  of  tariff  would  not  only  fail  to  meet  our  Lome 
·commitments hut  would also represent an  additional  burden for  the  EU  budget as  it 
would necessarily lead to the increase of direct aid for EU  producers if the tariff were 
to  he  fixed  at  an  inadequate  level.  The  EC  budgetary  system  does  not  allow 
compensation for  such  additional costs by  the increase of own  resources through  a 
higher tariff for banana. 
Ecuador  seeks  a  tariff-rate  quota  system.  This  system  should  not  be 
discriminatory and should include an increase of the quantity of Latin America banana 
exports to  the EU.  Ecuador prefers that the reference period for the  distribution of 
licences should be as recent as possible and insists on a revised definition of importers 
(shippers/importers) as "Primary importers". It  proposes a single tariff quota of e.g. 
3.3.Mio tat a tariff level of EURO 75/t and to offer to the ACP operators licences on 
the basis of a different reference period, favourable for them (1994-1996). Caribbean 
operators agree with this approach. However the proposal of Ecuador seems to pose a 
specific problem to the African ACP. Furthermore since the US  appears to. insist that 
in  any TRQ  ~ystcm the  licence distribution be based on  pre-1993, and Ecuador and 
most others insist on  post-1993, the TRQ proposal does not offer an agreed solution at 
this time! 
2.  State of debate on EU options: 
Despite  continued  and  serious  efforts  to  find  an  «agreed»  solution,  the 
situation remains unclear, in  particular as  far as an  acceptable and WTO compatible 
EU option is concerned. 
A  clearly  WTO-compatible  solution,  e.g.  the  «single-Tariff»  approach,  is 
rejected by  almost all  the operators as they arc not interested in  losing the substantial 
benefit  from  the  «quota  rent»  which  on  average  is estimated at  an  additional  200 
EURO/to for bananas imported into the EU. However, some accept the idea of a two 
stage approach, starting from a TRQ scenario which would lead, after negotiations e.g. 
in  the  framework  of the  next  multilateral  trade  round  in  order  to  establish  the 
appropriate new tariff rate, to a tariff only system and a tariff preference for the ACP 
countries. The US  administration prefers a quick move towards a tariff only system 
whereas some operators would prefer a longer period of adaptation, e.g. until 2005. 
Even in  the context of a two-stage approach, the first phase requires a WTO-
compatible and generally acceptable TRQ solution.  Such a TRQ phase poses major 
problems despite all  efforts to find common ground, notably with  the complainants. 
There· are two major difficulties: the definition of the appropriate TRQ and the system 
of distribution of licences. To the extent that any proposed change leads to increase 
•  .. imports at  lower prices than  at present, there would be  budgetary complications as 
outlined in .the Commission Communication of the month of May. 
3.  Definition ol'_the  ()pliom~:. 
In  its present regime, the EU applies a TRQ of 2.2. Mio/tons with an in-quota 
tariff of 75  EURO/ton in  accordance with  its WTO schedule.  In  addition it applies 
autonomousiy  a  further  TRQ  of 0.353  Mio  tons  also  at  75  EURO/ton  to  cover 
increased  demand  for  bananas  within  the  EU  following  accession  to  the  EFf  A 
countries.  All  ACP suppliers benefit froin  duty-free access within  these two quotas 
and in  addition the present regime allows duty-free access of  0.857 Mio tons outside 
these TRQ's for traditional ACP supplies. 
The Community regarded this access as  a volume limited tariff preference and hence 
covered  the  existing  article  I  waiver.  However,  the  WTO  concluded  that  a  tariff 
preference, which is limited in size, is by definition a tariff quota. Unless such a quota· 
respects  article  XIII  GATT  rules  in  terms  in  particular of erga  omnes  access  and 
tJistrih~tion,  it  requires  a derogation  (waiver)  from  that article.  In  GATT history,  a 
waiver based on miicle XIII  has only been granted one~. Our numerous contacts have 
made it dear that complainants and parties involved are either not ready to grant such· 
a waiver or only at a veryhigh price. 
On the other hand, the suggestion (made in the so-called "counterfactual" from 
the WTO arbitrators) that the EU should just lift the )imitation in  size and grant an 
unlimited preference for the ACP is strongly  contested by the US· administration and 
the  third countries suppliers. They claim that this solution would even  increase the 
discrimination  against  LA  banana  producers  in  offering  additional  market 
opportunities  for  the  ACP  which  could,  through  massive  investments  in  the  more 
competitive ACP, lead to serious market disruptions for LA traders. 
This  situation  limits  the  range  of options  decisively.  From  the  numerous 
proposals the central scenarios under active discussion remain: 
<~)  to create a second, autonomous in-tariff quota of a quantity which exceeds 
O.H57 Mio t with  mechanisms to ensure that some of this quota is filled by sales from 
Latin America while ACP exports are maintained. 
b)  to create one single tariff quota of. 3.2 Mio to.  at the tariff level of EURO 
75/t, with a zero tariff preference for the ACP. Licences would only be available to 
"primary importers"  as  originally defined in  Reg ·1442/93  ..  This  leaves  the  central 
question of what reference period should be used for licence distribution unresolved. 
Moreover, it remains to be shown that such an  approach can maintain all  traditional 
ACP entitlements. 
c)  the establishment of  .a  «tariff only » system. This option would require the 
· deconsolidation of the present bound tariffs and the negotiation of a new rate .on  the 
basis of GATT article XXVIII. 
4.  System for the distribution of licences The  WTO  h<!S  condemned  the  present  system  of  licence  distribution.  It 
indicated  that  the  distribution  could  be  based  on  for  example  a -«First  come,  first 
served» procedure or through auctioning. This would not preclude a historic system 
which did not perpetuate the aspects of the previous system which were condemned. 
Work  has  continued  on  all  these  options  with  the  aim  of reaching  a  fair, 
balanced and administratively manageable solution. 
As to the historical reference period, the US  continues to insist on the more 
distant  reference  period  (pre-1993)  whereas  Ecuador wants  the  most  recent  period 
available. Various attempts to compromise between these two positions have failed to 
bear  fruit.  Ap:.111  from  this  system,  other  methods  of distribution  have  also  been 
examined. 
The first come first served system has very limited support and constitutes a 
particular heavy administrative burden for the EC. At the same time, smaller operators 
which are not "primary importers" could be eliminated from the markets. 
Auctioning  continues  to  be  questioned  as  to  its  WTO-compatibility.  No 
operators were in favour of this ~ystem. Other convent~onal systems appear unlikely to 
provide a resolution of this issue. 
However, modalities and instruments of WTO for quota management and in 
particular licences distribution are under active discussion in the WTO Committee on 
agriculture and there is  so far no clear consensus on  how such WTO rules that exist 
should be interpreted. Continued disputes among WTO-members on what should be 
WTO  compatible  in  this  area  may  lead  to  the  gradual  reduction  of the  options 
available and  applied so  far,  with  far-reaching  implications  for  agricultural  trade  in 
general. 
5.  Conclusions 
A  Commission  proposal  needs to guarantee the end of the  banana disputes 
with the US and Ecuador. It should also ensure the respect of the EU's international 
obligations  vis-a-vis  the  ACP  countries  and,  insofar  as  possible,  that  no  new 
intemational disputes will  arise in this sector.  At present no TRQ solution has been 
found  which  would ineet those objectives.  Since  at  present no agreement with  the 
complainants can be reached on a tariff rate quota system the Commission is not in a 
position to make such a proposal to the Council. 
If this  situation continues in  spite of the efforts that  have  been  made,  there 
would be  little  other option  than  a  tariff-only solution  including negotiations  under 
GATT Article xxvm. 
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